Who could possibly have seen the banking disaster coming?

What was the theory behind the Glass-Steagall Act? Foremost, it was meant to restore a certain sobriety to American finance. In the 1920s, the banker had gone from a person of sober rectitude to a huckster who encouraged people to gamble on risky stocks and bonds. As [chief congressional counsel Ferdinand] Pecora noted, small investors identified banks with security, so that National City salesmen “came to them clothed with all the authority and prestige of the magic name ‘National City.’” It was also argued that the union of deposit and securities banking created potential conflicts of interest. Banks could take bad loans, repackage them as bonds, and fob them off on investors as National City had done with Latin American loans. They could even lend the investors money to buy the bonds. A final problem with the banks’ brokerage affiliates was that they forced the Federal Reserve System to stand behind both depositors and speculators. If a securities bank failed, the Fed might need to rescue it to protect the parent bank. In other words, the government might have to protect speculators to save depositors.

— Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan, 1990, pg. 375. (Emphasis added)

 

The repeal of Glass-Steagall was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton in 1999.

The arguments made to repeal the act were primarily

1. Depository institutions will now operate in “deregulated” financial markets in which distinctions between loans, securities, and deposits are not well drawn. They are losing market shares to securities firms that are not so strictly regulated, and to foreign financial institutions operating without much restriction from the Act.
2. Conflicts of interest can be prevented by enforcing legislation against them, and by separating the lending and credit functions through forming distinctly separate subsidiaries of financial firms.
3. The securities activities that depository institutions are seeking are both low-risk by their very nature, and would reduce the total risk of organizations offering them – by diversification.
4. In much of the rest of the world, depository institutions operate simultaneously and successfully in both banking and securities markets. Lessons learned from their experience can be applied to our national financial structure and regulation

Emphasis added

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A brilliant and simple guide to how we are being lied to about the meltdown

First appeared at BlownMortgage.com

There has been a deliberately high signal-to-noise-ratio ("the ratio of a signal power to the noise power corrupting the signal") around the financial fiasco. The reason for this is the same reason that a magician does patter — to divert your attention from the sleight-of-hand.

We have heard long explanations about how no one could have seen this coming and how we can’t fire the people who got us into this mess to get us out of it and how we are going to borrow our way out of a debt crisis and how the value of loans shouldn’t reflect actual market conditions when the market is a mess. All of which can be translated to, "pay no attention to the man behind the curtain."

I am not sure if this rises to the exact level of a conspiracy or if it just coinciding self-interest by people who stand to lose a lot of money if that curtain is pulled back. I am sure that the effect is the same as a conspiracy.

However, Bill Black thinks it’s a conspiracy and that’s good enough for me. In an interview on Bill Moyer’s show Mr. Black — the senior regulator during the S&L crisis & now a prof of economy and law at U. of Missouri — applies a brilliantly sharp Occam’s Razor to the entire fiasco. In less than half-an-hour he explains what went wrong, why and why what we’re doing won’t work. This is a truly bipartisan dissection. Watch it and learn.

My favorite part is his conclusion (transcript here):

So stop that current system. We’re hiding the losses, instead of trying to find out the real losses. Stop that, because you need good information to make good decisions, right? Follow what works instead of what’s failed. Start appointing people who have records of success, instead of records of failure. That would be another nice place to start. There are lots of things we can do. Even today, as late as it is. Even though they’ve had a terrible start to the administration. They could change, and they could change within weeks. And by the way, the folks who are the better regulators, they paid their taxes. So, you can get them through the vetting process a lot quicker.

(Hat tip to Infectious Greed, Financial Armageddon, and Washington’s Blog)

Here’s part 1 of the interview, go here for part 2 and here for part 3.

"The tragedy of this crisis is that it didn’t have to happen at all." — William Black

Is Credit Crunch the son of Capt. Crunch?

First there was Credit Crunch the Reality, then came The Boardgame and now it’s a cereal!

In the UK, Credit Crunch is THE phrase used to describe the current mess. It is everywhere  — sale signs in stores, headlines, etc. We here in the US are really failing to brand the crisis. We have mortgage meltdown, the recession, but nothing that really distinguishes this Financial Fiasco ©.